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Abstract
Claims have been made that the Court of Justice of the
European Union (CJEU) is more lenient in accepting age dis-
criminating measures affecting older people than in those
affecting younger people. This claim is scrutinised in this art-
icle, first, by making a quantitative analysis of the outcomes
of the CJEU’s case law on age discrimination cases, followed
by a qualitative analysis of the line of reasoning of the CJEU
in these cases and concluding with an evaluation of the
Court’s reasoning against three theoretical approaches that
set the context for the assessment of the justifications of
age discrimination: complete life view, fair innings argument
and typical anti-discrimination approach. The analysis shows
that the CJEU relies more on the complete life view
approach to assess measures discriminating old people and
the fair innings argument approach to assess measures dis-
criminating young people. This results in old people often
having to accept disadvantageous measures and young
workers often being treated more favourably.
Keywords: age discrimination, old people, young people,
complete life view, fair innings argument
1 Introduction
Age is as discrimination ground included in Directive
2000/78/EC, establishing a general framework for
equal treatment in employment and occupation (further
referred to as Framework Equality Directive or FED).
Approximately twenty years on, there exists a substan-
tive body of case law (I identified forty-eight cases for
this article) from the Court of Justice of the European
Union (CJEU). The vast majority of these cases concern
older workers, whereas a much smaller number of cases
deal with discrimination younger workers. Over the
course of time the impression has grown that the CJEU
is more lenient in justifying measures that are disadvan-
tageous to older workers compared with measures nega-
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1. E.g. B.P. ter Haar and M. Rönnmar, Intergenerational Bargaining, EU
Age Discrimination and EU Policies – An Integrated Analysis, Report for
the project ‘Intergenerational Bargaining Towards Integrated Bargaining
for Younger and Older Workers in EU Countries (2014), at 25; and
T. Gyulavári, ‘Age Discrimination: Recent Case Law of the European
Court of Justice’, 14 ERA Forum 377 (2013).
tively affecting younger workers.1 This study attempts
to find out whether this impression is correct.
Towards this end I elaborate in Section 2 on age as
discrimination ground and its regulation in EU law,
including a discussion of theoretical approaches, i.e.
complete life view and fair innings argument, underpin-
ning the evaluation of age discrimination cases. Section
3 holds a quantitative analysis assessing how many cases
the CJEU found to be precluded or not by the FED and
whether there is a difference in numbers between the
four age categories (old, young, middle-aged and other).
If there is a significant difference between the age cate-
gories old and young, this could be a first indication that
the Court might indeed be discriminatory. In Section 4
a qualitative analysis is made of the content of the cases
identified in Section 3. The aim of the analysis is to
identify the main reasons for the CJEU to conclude that
a measure would be precluded by EU law or not. The
analysis is done per age category. In Section 5 the out-
come of the qualitative analysis is evaluated against the
background of the theoretical approaches presented in
Section 2 in order to determine whether the CJEU is
indeed biased in its case law and has hence at least cre-
ated the image of being discriminatory in age discrimi-
nation cases.
2 Age as Discrimination
Ground in EU Law
When the Framework Equality Directive 2000/78/EC
( FED) was adopted, it was not so evident to include age
as discrimination ground as it currently seems to be.
Distinctions made on the grounds of age are routinely
accepted as dictated by common sense. For example, it
is generally accepted that there is a minimum age for
driving a car, drinking alcohol, voting, acting as a judge,
etc.2 Likewise, it seems commonly accepted that age
limits are set to certain activities such as sports, model-
ling, etc. as well as certain jobs that require good physi-
cal health and strength, up to the fact that at a certain
age working life ends. Furthermore, unlike discrimi-
nation on grounds such as gender, sexual orientation
and race, age is a passing personal characteristic, giving
rise to the argument for a more lax protection against
2. M. Sargant, ‘Young People and Age Discrimination’, 2 E-Journal of
International and Comparative Labour Studies 1 (2013).
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discrimination on the grounds of age. The acceptance of
age as a passing personal characteristic has consequences
for how the discriminatory measures are being evalu-
ated. This is not only reflected in the positive law of the
FED, which allows for general justifications based on
labour market-related issues,3 but also in theoretical
approaches.
Two dominant theories in this context are: the complete
life view and the fair innings argument.4 Both have the
commonality that equality between individuals on the
grounds of age should not be assessed at one particular
moment in time (only) but across a whole lifetime (of
work). In particular, McKerlie defined the complete life
view in the following terms: ‘[D]ifferent people’s share
of resources, or welfare, should be equal when we
consider the amounts of those things that they receive
over the complete course of their lives.’5 This means
that there will be no discrimination if over the course of
a lifetime everyone is eligible for the same benefits and
subjected to the same burdens.6 Therefore, it is accepta-
ble or even necessary to accept less favourable treatment
today, e.g. mandatory retirement or lower wage at the
beginning of a career, which might be compensated by
more favourable treatment received in the past or to be
received in the future. The fair innings argument claims
that sometimes we should discriminate on the grounds
of age ‘to avoid inequality or to achieve substantive
equality between generations’.7 Effectively, this view
favours a positive discrimination approach to ensure
that the younger generation will get the same opportuni-
ties as the older generation has had. If, at a certain
moment in time, both age groups (young and old) were
treated the same, this may result in a permanent
disadvantage to younger workers compared with the
older workers who have lived and worked longer and, as
such, have already acquired advantages the young could
not yet.8
Both these approaches have been critiqued for falling
short on certain aspects. One of these aspects is the fact
that both approaches are based on a form of distributive
inequality over the course of time; however, there are
forms of age discrimination that may harm the dignity
of a human being or a person’s autonomy.9 This can
particularly be the case when the age distinction is based
on stereotypes.10 Therefore arguments have been made
for a multidimensional approach that takes into account
‘the full range of wrongs and harms potentially caused
3. Recital 25 preamble and Art. 6 FED.
4. Cf. R. Horton, ‘Justifying Age Discrimination in the EU’, in U. Belavusau
and K. Henrard (eds.), EU Anti-Discrimination Law Beyond Gender
(2018) 273, at 277-278.
5. D. McKerlie, ‘Equality and Time’, 99 Ethics 475 (1989).
6. Horton, above n. 4, at 277.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. Horton, above n. 4, at 279. See also: S. Fredman, Discrimination Law
(2011); and B. Hepple, ‘Age Discrimination in Employment: Implement-
ing the Framework Directive 2000/78/EC’, in S. Fredman and S. Spenc-
er (eds.), Age as an Equality Issue: Legal and Policy Perspectives
(2003).
10. Horton, above n. 4, at 283.
by differences in treatment because of age’.11 In her
study about how the CJEU justifies age discrimination,
Horton could identify neither a clear preference of the
court for one of the approaches, nor a consequent full
account of all the wrongs and harms caused by the dis-
criminatory measure.12 However, the three approaches,
namely complete life view, fair innings argument and
the typical anti-discrimination approach, can serve to
clarify how the CJEU got its image that it is more leni-
ent in accepting less favourable treatment of older work-
ers and more strict in protecting young workers from
age discrimination. In very general terms it could be
stated that when the CJEU follows a complete life view
approach both age groups have to accept disadvanta-
geous treatments at times, whereas the fair innings argu-
ment would justify younger people being treated more
favourably sometimes in order to create better opportu-
nities for them that older workers already (could have)
had. When more measures under the complete life view
are accepted that negatively affect older workers than
younger workers and when there are more measures
under the fair innings argument that positively affect
younger workers to the detriment of older workers, the
overall picture is that younger workers are treated more
favourably than older workers. This would confirm the
image of the CJEU being discriminatory in age discri-
mination cases.
To find out what the CJEU is actually doing, a combi-
nation of qualitative and quantitative research methods
is applied. First, an inventory is made of all the cases
dealing with age discrimination. These are then ordered
by age category, subject of the measure and whether the
CJEU found that it would be precluded or not preclu-
ded by the FED. This will give a first impression of
whether the CJEU precludes more measures that are
disadvantageous to young people than to older people.
Following this quantitative analysis is a qualitative anal-
ysis of the case law based on age category. The focus of
the analysis will be on the main reasons for the CJEU to
conclude whether a measure should be precluded by the
FED or not. This means it will not be an analysis of
how the CJEU dealt with cases in relation to the positive
law of the FED. The analysis of the main reasons for
precluding a measure from the FED or not will give an
impression of what the underlying theoretical approach
could have been. Understanding this will eventually
lead to an evaluation of whether the CJEU is discrimi-
nating in age discrimination cases.
3 Quantitative Analysis of Age
Discrimination Cases
Based on Article 18 FED, Member States had until
December 2003 to implement the directive, with the
option of extending this period by another three years,
11. Ibid., at 280.
12. Horton, above n. 4.
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making a total of six years. Consequently, we find the
first cases dealing with age discrimination only since
200413 and a real increase in the number of cases after
2006, i.e. when the implementation period expired for
all the Member States.
A search in Eurlex for cases based on the FED in gener-
al results in over seventy cases, more than half of which,
forty-eight, deal with age discrimination.14 A further
breakdown of the numbers by different age categories
(old, young and middle-aged; and a rest category
‘other’) reveals that the majority of these cases concern
older workers (twenty-four). We also see a slow increase
in the number of cases concerning young people (seven)
and merely five cases dealing with issues affecting mid-
dle-aged people. A rather surprisingly high number of
cases (twelve) deal with issues that cannot be directly
linked to a specific age category. The development of
these cases over time is shown in Figure 1.
The large number of cases dealing with issues concern-
ing older workers is clearly visible in Figure 1. By far
the majority of these cases deal with issues related to
retirement (see also Table 1). Cases dealing with issues
concerning young people and middle-aged people seem
to pick up pace from 2013. The cases in the latter group
affect people who are distinguished from a younger
group of workers since the divide often lies around the
age of thirty or thirty-five; hence the qualification of
‘middle-aged’.
The last category of cases, ‘other’, is remarkably large,
with twelve cases. Figure 1 shows a strong increase in
cases of this kind after 2011. A brief glance at the con-
tent of these cases reveals that a good number of them is
actually related to the CJEU’s judgment in the case
13. An exception is the case Mangold, which was dealt with before the
implementation period had passed. Case 144/04 Werner Mangold v.
Rüdiger Helm, [2005] ECR I- 09981.
14. Eurlex search dated 26 October 2019. There are more cases dealing
with age discrimination that did not show up in this search since they
are not based on the FED. For example, Case 619/18 European Com-
mission v. Republic of Poland ECLI:EU:C:2019:531. Since the main top-
ic of this article is about the CJEU’s attitude regarding justifications
based on Art. 6 FED, such omissions do not affect this study.
Hütter.15 This may be briefly explained as follows: in
Hütter the CJEU ruled that a measure excluding work
experience gained before the age of eighteen resulted in
a difference in treatment between young people in the
same age group and was therefore to be interpreted as
being precluded by Articles 1, 2 and 6 of the FED.16
Following the ruling in Hütter, similar national meas-
ures, mainly from Austria and Germany, have been
adjusted to end the discriminatory effect they had. In
the cases dealing with these measures, questions have
been raised as to whether the adjustments have suffi-
ciently neutralised the (effects of the) previously exist-
ing discriminatory situation.17 Since these cases deal
with transitional legislation they cannot be directly
linked to a particular age category, and hence the cate-
gorisation as ‘other’.
In Table 1 the cases are listed by age category and sub-
sequently by the subject of the measures that are chal-
lenged and the CJEU’s conclusion concerning whether
the measure would be precluded or not by the FED. 
Before discussing the content of Table 1 a few prelimi-
nary remarks need to be made. A number of cases that
are included in Figure 1 are not included in this table.
Werner Fries,18 a case rather similar to Prigge, is exclu-
ded, because, even though it popped up in Eurlex by
searching on the FED, it is actually based on Regulation
(EC) No 216/2008, which deals with civil aviation safe-
ty in Europe. Case C19 is also not included because the
CJEU concluded that the tax measure, which intended
to create incentives for older workers to work longer,
does not fall within the scope of the FED. Lastly, Garda
Síochána20 is not included because the CJEU was not
asked to determine whether the national measure was
discriminatory on grounds of age; instead it was asked
15. Case 88/08 David Hütter v. Technische Universität Graz, [2009] ECR I-
 05325.
16. Ibid., Rec 49.
17. For a more elaborate discussion of these cases see section 4.3.
18. Case 190/16 Werner Fries v. Lufthansa CityLine GmbH ECLI:EU:C:
2017:513.
19. Case 122/15 Proceedings brought by C. ECLI:EU:C:2016:391.
20. Case 378/17 The Minister for Justice and Equality and The Commis-
sioner of the Garda Síochána v. Workplace Relations Commission
ECLI:EU:C:2018:979.
Figure 1 Overview of cases on age discrimination dealt with by the CJEU
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about procedural issues to ensure compliance with the
FED.
When reviewing the content of Table 1 what stands out
the most is that in all four age categories the CJEU has
found that the FED would preclude and not preclude a
national measure. Second, regarding many of the widely
defined topics the Court finds both measures that can be
justified and measures that cannot be justified. This is
even the case for the first topic in the category ‘old’ (i.e.
mandatory retirement; fixed age for retirement; auto-
matic termination), albeit that out of eight cases the
Court concluded only once that EU law would preclude
the national measure, namely Commission v. Hungary.21
21. Case 286/12 European Commission v. Hungary ECLI:EU:C:2012:687.
As the name of the case suggests, this is not a request for a preliminary
ruling by the CJEU, but an action by the Commission against the state
Keeping in mind the focus of this study (is the CJEU
ruling more favourable to young people than older
people?), it is particularly interesting to note that in the
‘young’ category the CJEU not only finds measures that
would be precluded by EU law, but also those that
would not be precluded. Moreover, when we transpose
the information of Table 1 from absolute numbers into
relative numbers (percentage) of measures to be preclu-
ded (yes) and not precluded (no) by the FED, there is
hardly any difference between the categories (see
Table 2).
Hungary for failing to fulfil its obligations under Arts. 2 and 6 of the
FED. For an elaborate discussion of this case, especially its political sen-
sitiveness, see U. Belavusau, ‘On Age Discrimination and Beating Dead
Dogs: Commission v. Hungary’, 50 Common Market Law Review 1145
(2013).
Table 1 Overview of topics by age category and outcome of the CJEU’s rulings
Category Topic Rulings CJEU – measure precluded
Yes No
Old Mandatory retirement; fixed age for retire-
ment; automatic termination
Commission v. Hungary Palacios de la Villa; Age Concern;
Petersen; Rosenbladt; Georgiev;
Fuchs & Köhler; Hörnveldt
Severence payment, etc. when at retirement
age
Ingeniørforeningen i Danmark;
Dansk Jurist; Rasmussen
Odar; Ingeniørforeningen i Danmark
v. Tekniq
Retirement irt physical requirements capabil-
ities
Prigge
Age-related retirement contributions/limited
entitlements to retirement schemes/other
limitations related to retirement schemes
HK Denmark; Parris; Kleinsteuber;
Felber
Prohibition combining retirement pension
with other incomes
Florescu; SCMD
Older workers and fixed-term contracts Mangold Hubertus
Young Age limitation on calculating years of expe-
rience/development of pay grades/salary
reductions
Kücükdeveci; Hütter Lesar; Escribano Vindel; Horgan and
Keegan
Access to severance/compensation pay-
ments
O.
Special types of employment contracts limit-
ed to age
Abercrombie
Middle-
aged
Maximum age for recruitment Vital Pérez Wolf; Salaberria Sorondo
Access limitations based on age De Lange
Other Reclassification measures to correct previ-
ously discriminatory measures/transitional
system to protect established advantages
Starjakob; Schmitzer; Leitner Hennings and Mai; Specht e.o.; Stoll-
witzer; Unland; Österreichischer
Gewerkschaftsbund
Relative age issues Bartsch
non-specific age- and experience-related
issues
Tyrolean Airways; Bowman
Miscellaneous Pohl
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Given the rather insignificant difference between the
age categories, especially between old and young, quan-
titatively, the proposition that the CJEU is more lenient
in accepting discriminatory measures affecting older
workers than younger workers seems false. However,
these are just numbers. In the next section an analysis of
the content of the cases will be made with a focus on the
CJEU’s reasoning. 
4 Qualitative Analysis of Age
Discrimination Cases
In this section the content of the cases identified in Sec-
tion 3 will be analysed. The analysis will be done by age
category, starting with old, followed by young, other
and middle-aged. The results of the analysis will be dis-
cussed in Section 5, where they will be evaluated in light
of the theoretical approaches described in Section 2.
4.1 Analysis of the Cases in the Category ‘Old’
As already indicated in Section 3, half of the age discri-
mination cases (twenty-four out of forty-eight) are
found in the category ‘old’. Many of the cases in this
category have been elaborately discussed in the litera-
ture,22 especially those dealing with mandatory retire-
ment,23 which form the majority of cases in this catego-
ry. Merely three cases deal with ‘just’ older workers and
22. E.g. among many others: Gyulavári, above n. 1; M. Schmidt, ‘The Prin-
ciple of Non-discrimination in Respect of Age: Dimensions of the ECJ’s
Mangold Judgment’, 7 German Law Journal 505 (2006); L. Wadding-
ton, ‘Case C–411/05, Félix Palacios de la Villa v. Cortefi el Servicios SA,
Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 16 October 2007’, 45
Common Market Law Review 895 (2008); C. O’Cinneide, ‘The Grow-
ing Importance of Age Equality’, 11 The Equal Rights Review 99
(2013); E. Dewhurst, ‘Proportionality Assessments of Mandatory Retire-
ment Measures: Uncovering Guidance for National Courts in Age
Discrimination Cases’, 45 Industrial Law Journal 60 (2016); and
J. Fudge, ‘Dignity, Disadvantage, and Age: Putting Constitutional and
Fundamental Rights to Work for Older Workers’, in A. Numhauser-
Henning (ed.), Elder Law. Evolving European Perspectives (2017) 55.
23. E.g. Dewhurst, above n. 22; M. Schlachter, ‘Mandatory Retirement and
Age Discrimination Under EU Law’, 27 International Journal of
Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 287 (2011); and
A. Numhauser-Henning, ‘The EU Ban on Age-Discrimination and Older
Workers: Potentials and Pitfalls’, 29 International Journal of Compar-
ative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 391 (2013).
fixed-term contracts. However, the cases Georgiev24 and
Hubertus25 actually also deal with retirement, since they
are about national measures that allow for the postpone-
ment of the retirement – in Georgiev via a limited num-
ber of one-year fixed-term contracts and in Hubertus (as
understood by the CJEU26) by changing one condition
in the existing (permanent) employment contract, with
half a year per time such as agreed upon by both par-
ties.27 The CJEU considered that such measures are not
precluded by the FED because they take the entitlement
to a pension as an alternative source of income into
account.28 Additionally, in Georgiev the Court con-
cluded that age was not the only criterion,29 and in
Hubertus it considered that the measure could not even
be considered unfavourable in the sense of Article 2(2)
FED.30 The third case is Mangold, and even though the
implementation period of the FED had not expired
yet31 the CJEU did consider the content. It concluded
that the measure would be precluded by the FED since
it was too generic, i.e. neither proportionate nor necessa-
ry, to achieve the aim. As such, the measure did not take
into account the structure of the labour market or the
personal situation of the person in question.32
When we focus on the majority of the cases in this cate-
gory, which deal with retirement, we can see that only
five cases were found to be precluded by the FED ver-
sus fourteen cases that would not be precluded. With
respect to two wide subjects related to retirement, i.e.
measures related to access to retirement schemes and
measures prohibiting the combination of retirement
pensions with other incomes, all national measures chal-
lenged were found not to be precluded (see Table 1). In
the cases SCMD33 and Florescu,34 the CJEU concluded
24. Joined cases 250/09 and 268/09 Vasil Ivanov Georgiev v. Tehnicheski
universitet - Sofia, filial Plovdiv, [2010] ECR I-11869.
25. Case 46/17 Hubertus John v. Freie Hansestadt Bremen ECLI:EU:C:
2018:131.
26. Ibid., Rec 44-6.
27. Ibid., Rec 12-3.
28. Georgiev, above n. 24, Rec 63; Hubertus, above n. 25, Rec 57.
29. Georgiev, above n. 24, Rec 62-3.
30. Hubertus, above n. 25, Rec 32.
31. Germany had opted for the six-year implementation period.
32. Mangold, above n. 13, Rec 65 and 78.
33. Case 262/14, Sindicatul Cadrelor Militare Disponibilizate în rezervă și
în retragere (SCMD) v. Ministerul Finanțelor Publice ECLI:EU:C:
2015:336.
34. Case 258/14, Eugenia Florescu and Others v. Casa Judeţeană de Pensii
Sibiu and Others ECLI:EU:C:2017:448.
Table 2 Outcome of CJEU rulings by absolute and relative numbers by age category
Absolute numbers Relative numbers (%)
Category Yes No Yes No
Old 6 16 27 73
Young 2 5 29 71
Middle-aged 1 3 25 75
Other 3 9 25 75
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that the national measure did not fall within the scope of
the directive, because the distinction made in the legis-
lation concerns different treatment on grounds not cov-
ered by the directive.35
In Parris the CJEU dealt with a measure fixing an age
for the entitlement to a survivor’s pension. Such meas-
ures are covered by paragraph 2 of Article 6 FED and
therefore do not constitute discrimination on the
grounds of age.36 In HK Denmark37 the CJEU con-
cluded that the measure setting requirements for contri-
butions to a pension scheme could be justified by a legit-
imate aim. Interestingly, the aim concerned older work-
ers as well as younger workers, namely by relating the
height of the contribution to age all workers, young and
old, starting to work at Experian should be able to build
up reasonable retirement savings;38 this the CJEU also
found appropriate and necessary. The Court initially
seems to reflect in this ruling a fair innings argument
but concludes with a complete life view. The aim is for
both young and old to be able to build up reasonable
retirement savings in the time left till retirement.
Interestingly, in the case Kleinsteuber the CJEU con-
cluded that there is a situation of difference in treatment
owing to a combination of measures that ‘abstractly’
could result in a disadvantage to employees who were
‘young when the employment relationship started, the
periods of service were short and the ceiling of reckona-
ble years of service was set low’.39 Mars (the employer
in this case), argued, however, that owing to the applica-
tion of pro rata temporis, in effect the outcome is not
always to the disadvantage of younger workers, because
the measure is based on the length of service and not
age.40 In its final conclusion the CJEU indicates that
such a measure would not be precluded by the FED;
hence, the Court here shows a clear appreciation of a
measure based on the complete life view.
Another group of cases that deserves separate attention
concerns entitlements to, among others, severance pay-
ments when also eligible for an old-age pension. In total,
five cases have been raised with the CJEU. In three of
them the Court concluded that the national measure was
precluded by the FED, and in two it found that such
was not the case (see Table 1). The common issue in
these cases is that, in general, severance payments are
intended for workers who are expected or have to
remain active on the labour market. Such is presumed
not to be the case with persons who are (also) eligible for
35. In SCMD the difference in treatment is based on a choice public sector
employees can make for earlier retirement (Rec 24-25), and in Florescu
the difference in treatment was based on different public sector profes-
sions (Rec 64-5). For an interesting comment on other aspects of the
case see Florescu: M. Rocca, ‘Florescu: A Memorandum of Understand-
ing Finally Before the Court’, 4 International Labor Rights Case Law 98
(2018).
36. Case 443/15 David L. Parris v. Trinity College Dublin and Others
ECLI:EU:C:2016:897, Rec 73-76.
37. Case 476/11 HK Danmark acting on behalf of Glennie Kristensen v.
Experian A/S ECLI:EU:C:2013:590.
38. Ibid., Rec 58.
39. Case 354/16 Ute Kleinsteuber v. Mars GmbH ECLI:EU:C:2017:539, Rec
56.
40. Ibid., Rec 58.
an old-age pension. Therefore, in general, the (legiti-
mate) aim of national measures precluding persons eligi-
ble for an old-age pension from a form of severance pay-
ment is to prevent persons claiming a benefit they will
not need. The problem with such measures, however, is
that they also preclude older workers who wish to
remain active on the labour market.41 Furthermore,
such measures may drive persons into early retirement,
resulting in a lower pension scheme compared with
when they would have been able to remain on the labour
market.42 When reviewing the CJEU’s rulings in these
cases it can be concluded that the Court consistently
finds measures not accommodating the interest of the
persons who are excluded from a form of severance pay-
ment to be precluded by the FED43 and measures taking
into account the specific position of the worker as not to
be precluded by the FED.44 Especially when the nation-
al measure, in the long run, results in a reduction of
income compared with the same age group that was not
affected by the measure, the Court finds the measure
unjustifiable.45 Here we see again a complete life view
approach by the Court.
Most of the cases in this category, however, deal with
measures that have linked age to (mandatory) retire-
ment. In only two out of the eight cases did the CJEU
find the national measure to be precluded by the FED.
In the first case, Prigge, a clause in a collective agree-
ment was challenged that fixed the age of sixty as the
limit up to which persons are considered to possess the
physical capabilities to (safely) carry out the profession
of pilot.46 The measure was tested against Articles 2(5),
4(1) and 6 FED but could not be justified by any of
them. The age of sixty was considered to be too low to
protect public security or the protection of health as
provided for by Article 5(2) FED, since internationally
it is set at sixty-five.47 With respect to Article 4(1) FED,
the CJEU considered that possessing certain physical
capabilities could be considered a genuine job require-
ment; however, a strict interpretation thereof results in
an assessment of the measure being disproportionate
and therefore precluded.48 Lastly, with respect to Art-
icle 6(1) FED, the CJEU concluded that the aim of the
measure (air traffic safety) could not be considered as a
legitimate aim recognised by the FED. This is remarka-
41. E.g. Case 515/13, Ingeniørforeningen i Danmark v. Tekniq ECLI:EU:C:
2015:115 (not precluded); and Case 499/08 Ingeniørforeningen i Dan-
mark v. Region Syddanmark, [2010] ECR I-09343 (precluded).
42. E.g. Case 546/11 Dansk Jurist- og Økonomforbund, acting on behalf of
Erik Toftgaard v. Indenrigs- og Sundhedsministeriet ECLI:EU:C:
2013:603.
43. Ingeniørforeningen i Danmark v Region Syddanmark, above n. 41, Rec
44-8; Case 441/14 Dansk Industri (DI), acting on behalf of Ajos A/S v.
Estate of Karsten Eigil Rasmussen ECLI:EU:C:2016:278, Rec 25-7; and
Dansk Jurist, above n. 42, Rec 55, 62 and 72.
44. Case 152/11, Johann Odar v. Baxter Deutschland GmbH ECLI:EU:C:
2012:772, Rec 48 and 53; Ingeniørforeningen i Danmark v. Tekniq,
above n. 41, Rec 27 (not unreasonable) and 37-9.
45. E.g. Ingeniørforeningen i Danmark, above n. 41, Rec 46.
46. Case 447/09 Reinhard Prigge and Others v. Deutsche Lufthansa AG,
[2011] ECR I-08003, Rec 14.
47. Ibid., Rec 63.
48. Ibid., Rec 75-6.
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ble, because, in general, the CJEU is very lenient in
accepting an aim as legitimate,49 especially when it is set
by social partners.50 In Prigge the CJEU considered it
too wide a stretch to accept ‘air traffic security’ as an
aim related to employment policy, the labour market or
vocational training.51 It seems that in this case the CJEU
followed a more typical anti-discriminatory approach.
In Petersen52 the CJEU considered that sixty-eight ‘may
be regarded as sufficiently high to serve as the endpoint
[…].’53 Furthermore, unlike in Prigge the measure could
be justified by a number of legitimate aims that were not
related to the capacity of the person to perform the pro-
fession.54 For example, consideration was given to the
situation of the (regional) labour market and control of
the public health sector expenditure.55 These reflect
considerations that fit with the complete life view.
The second case in which the CJEU concluded that the
national measure would be precluded by the FED is
Commission v. Hungary.56 The challenged legislation
lowers the age of mandatory retirement from seventy to
sixty-two for judges, prosecutors and notaries. The aim
of the legislation is, first, to standardise the rules relat-
ing to retirement for all persons and, second, to facilitate
the entry of young lawyers into the judicial system with
a view to establishing a ‘balanced age structure’.57 The
Court, following its previous case law in granting Mem-
ber States a broad margin of discretion in defining legit-
imate aims, considers both as a legitimate aim falling
within the scope of Article 6 FED.58 However, the
Court finds the measure to be not necessary since it does
not take into account the interests of the persons affect-
ed by the measure because the transposition period
allows them ample time to prepare to leave office.59 This
is very clearly a fair innings argument.
All other cases were considered not to be precluded by
the FED. These cases share the commonality that, in
general, the national measures took into account the
situation of older workers, either by providing them
with a choice to retire or to continue to work after
retirement age60 or by taking into account the labour
market situation.61 Most importantly, it was considered
by the CJEU that the workers were entitled to alterna-
49. Cf. B.P. ter Haar, ‘EU Age Discrimination Law: A Curse of a Blessing for
EU Youth Policy’, in U. Belavusau and K. Henrard (eds.), EU Anti-Discri-
mination Law Beyond Gender (2018) 295, at 306. See also: Case
411/05 Félix Palacios de la Villa v. Cortefiel Servicios SA, [2007] ECR
I-08531, Rec 68.
50. Odar, above n. 44, Rec 47, with reference to Case 141/11 Torsten
Hörnfeldt v. Posten Meddelande AB ECLI:EU:C:2012:421, Rec 32.
51. Prigge, above n. 46, Rec 81-2.
52. Case 341/08 Domnica Petersen v. Berufungsausschuss für Zahnärzte
für den Bezirk Westfalen-Lippe, [2010] ECR I-47.
53. Ibid., Rec 52.
54. Ibid., Rec 78.
55. Ibid., Rec 63 and 72-3.
56. Commission v. Hungary, above n. 21.
57. Ibid, Rec 28-31.
58. Ibid., Rec 61-63.
59. Ibid., Rec 72.
60. Joined cases 159/10 and 160/10 Gerhard Fuchs and Peter Köhler v.
Land Hessen, [2011] ECR I-06919; and Hörnfeldt, above n. 50.
61. Petersen, above n. 52.
tive income, i.e. old-age pensions.62 What is of concern
is not the exact amount of the pension but having access
to an alternative income.63 Other than some of the cases
addressed previously,64 in these cases there were no
issues of unequal treatment with respect to the alterna-
tive income that would put these workers at a disadvan-
tage compared with other workers of the same age
group. All this reflects a complete life view, especially
the fact that there is an acceptance that there is an end
to working life and that this is acceptable for as long as
the worker has been able to maximise his welfare, i.e. to
the same pension as he would have received without the
measure.
4.2 Analysis of the Cases in the Category
‘Young’
As already established in Section 3, quantitatively, out
of the seven cases in this category, only two cases were
considered to be precluded by the FED, whereas the
other five cases were not to be precluded.
One of the cases not to be precluded by the FED is the
case O.65 The CJEU dismissed this case as being non-
discriminatory, because the young person, O, was not in
a comparable insecure employment position after the
expiry of his fixed-term contract as other, older, work-
ers.66 Another case the CJEU found not to be precluded
by the FED is Abercrombie,67 which deals with the use of
on-call contracts for young people up to the age of twen-
ty-five, after which the contract is automatically termi-
nated. The legitimate aim underpinning the Italian
measure is to create a situation in which employers are
encouraged to hire young persons in order to offer them
opportunities to gain work experience that would create
a springboard for young people to new, more perma-
nent, employment opportunities.68 The CJEU was sym-
pathetic to the arguments of the Italian Government
that such a measure is necessitated by persistent eco-
nomic crisis and weak growth.69 Moreover, the Court
considered that being employed and gaining work expe-
rience is preferable over being unemployed when the
flexibility of on-call contracts would not be offered.
Hence, the Court concluded that the measure would not
be precluded by the FED.70 The arguments in both
these cases reflect a typical fair innings argument
approach.
62. Palacios de la Villa, above n. 49; Case 388/07 The Queen, on the
application of The Incorporated Trustees of the National Council for
Ageing (Age Concern England) v. Secretary of State for Business, Enter-
prise and Regulatory Reform, [2009] ECR I-01569; Case 45/09 Gisela
Rosenbladt v. Oellerking Gebäudereinigungsges. mbH, [2010] ECR
I-09391; Fuchs & Köhler, above n. 60; and Hörnfeldt, above n. 50.
63. Palacios de la Villa, above n. 51, Rec 73; and Rosenbladt, above n. 62,
Rec 73-76.
64. Especially the Danish cases Ingeniørforeningen i Danmark, above n. 43,
Dansk jurist, above n. 44, and Rasmussen, above n. 43.
65. Case 432/14 O v. Bio Philippe Auguste SARL ECLI:EU:C:2015:643.
66. Ibid., Rec 35.
67. Case 143/16 Abercrombie & Fitch Italia Srl v. Antonino Bordonaro
ECLI:EU:C:2017:566.
68. Ibid., Rec 33-4.
69. Ibid., Rec 42.
70. Ibid., Rec 47.
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The remaining five cases in this category deal with
(some form of advancement in) pay grades often in rela-
tion to the calculation of years of experience. The rul-
ings of the CJEU in these cases vary with two cases to
be found as being precluded by the FED and three cases
not being precluded (see Table 1). From the cases, in
the latter group Lesar71 is rather comparable to Parris
since it concerned an issue of fixing an age for admission
or entitlement to a pension scheme. In Lesar, unlike in
Parris, access to the pension scheme is directly based on
age, which results in a disadvantageous treatment of
young people.72 However, as in Parris, the difference in
treatment falls within the exception covered by para-
graph 2 of Article 6 FED.73
The other two cases, Escribano Vindel74 and Horgan &
Keegan,75 are rather similar and seem rather typical for
the financial crisis of 2008, which forced a number of
EU Member States to make major financial cutbacks in
the public sector.76 Both deal with a lowering of the pay
grade of judiciaries and of teachers, respectively. In
Escribano Vindel it was argued that the measure affected
young judiciaries more than older. However, following
the arguments of the Spanish government,77 the CJEU
concluded that there was no issue of age discrimination,
firstly, because the position of ‘ordinary’ judge is open
for persons up to the age of retirement And, secondly,
because there exists no obligation to move to higher
judiciary positions. Moreover the Court found no evid-
ence that a certain age group is more affected by the
measure than other groups; neither by age nor by length
of service.78 In Horgan & Keegan the challenged Irish
law reduced the pay by 10% for all new entrants into
the public service, including newly appointed teachers,
on or after 1 January 2011.79 Even though it was clear
that the majority of the new recruits were younger than
twenty-five, the CJEU found that the date of 1 January
2011 as a distinguishing criterion is neither inextricably
nor indirectly linked to age – especially since the age
profile of the cohort of new entrance did not differ
much from the cohort of entrance before the regime
change.80 The Court’s reasoning in Escribano Vindel
71. Case 159/15, Franz Lesar v. Beim Vorstand der Telekom Austria AG
eingerichtetes Personalamt ECLI:EU:C:2016:451.
72. Ibid., Rec 21, with reference to Hütter, above n. 15, Rec 38.
73. Lesar, above n. 71, Rec 31.
74. Case 49/18 Carlos Escribano Vindel v. Ministerio de Justicia
ECLI:EU:C:2019:106.
75. Case 154/18 Tomás Horgan and Claire Keegan v. Minister for Educa-
tion & Skills and Others ECLI:EU:C:2019:113.
76. See in general: special issue of the Industrial Law Journal, 41(3) (2012);
and F. Vandenbroucke, C. Barnard & G. De Baere (eds.), A European
Social Union after the Crisis (2017). More specifically related to the
cases addressed here, among others: A. Baylos and F. Trillo, ‘Social
Dimension of European Union and the Situation of the Labour Law in
the Member States: Evaluation of the Spanish Experience’, Revista de
Evaluación de Programas y Políticas Públicas Num 1 54 (2013); and
E. Achtsioglou and M. Doherty, ‘There Must Be Some Way Out of
Here: The Crisis, Labour Rights and Member States in the Eye of the
Storm’, 20 European Labour Law Journal 219 (2014).
77. Escribano Vindel, above n. 74, Rec 76.
78. Ibid., Rec 49, 56 and 58.
79. Horgan & Keegan, above n. 75, Rec 5.
80. Ibid., Rec 26.
reflects a complete life view. In Horgan & Keegan it is
not really possible to distinguish a certain approach, if
any it could be the complete life view, since there is
clearly no link to the fair innings argument, nor is there
any sign of consideration of the harm the measure may
cause for the young workers affected by the measure.
A commonality in the remaining two cases in this cate-
gory, Kücükdeveci81 and Hütter,82 is that age is used as a
determinant in the calculation of years of service – in
Kücükdeveci to determine the notice period and in Hüt-
ter to exclude years of work experience gained before the
age of eighteen. Another thing they have in common is
that the national measures resulted in a difference in
treatment between persons in the same age group. More
particularly, the measure in Kücükdeveci served several
aims, such as a longer notice period for workers over
forty, a progressive extension of the notice period for all
workers, and an age threshold of twenty-five in order to
give employers a relief from lengthy notice periods for
young workers.83 The underlying idea was that younger
workers are more flexible in finding new employment
and therefore would not need lengthy notice periods
and that a shorter notice period for younger workers
would facilitate their recruitment as employers would be
more willing to hire them.84 While the measure serves a
legitimate aim covered by Article 6 FED, the CJEU
found it inappropriate since it would result in unequal
treatment between young workers, in that those who
entered the labour market at a young age would be dis-
advantaged compared with those who entered the labour
market at an older age.85 The measure in Hütter exclu-
ded work experience gained before the age of eighteen.
Given the educational system in Austria, this would
mean that students who gained work experience during
an apprenticeship before the age of eighteen would not
count, whereas it would count when the apprenticeship
was taken after the age of eighteen. At what age the
apprenticeship was done depended on the type of edu-
cation chosen: vocational training or secondary educa-
tion. The measure thus resulted in unequal treatment
between young people based on the type of education,
i.e. secondary education or vocational training. Con-
sequently, the measure would negatively influence their
starting position on the labour market. In both cases,
thus, the CJEU concluded that the effect of the measure
was that the disadvantaged group would be permanently
be excluded from future opportunities, resulting in sub-
stantive inequality within the same age group. This
reflects the fair innings argument.
4.3 Analysis of the Cases in Category ‘Other’
Many of the cases in this category are related to the
CJEU’s ruling in Hütter, which resulted in adjustments
of several measures, especially in Austria and Germa-
81. Case 555/07 Seda Kücükdeveci v. Swedex GmbH & Co. KG, [2010]
ECR I- 00365.
82. Hütter, above n. 15.
83. Kücükdeveci, above n. 81, Rec 34.
84. Ibid., Rec 39.
85. Ibid., Rec 42.
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ny.86 As briefly addressed in Section 3, these cases can-
not be linked to a particular age category because it con-
cerns transitional legislation that aims to correct a previ-
ously discriminatory measure. What these measures
have in common is that they aim to protect the acquired
rights and legitimate expectations of workers that were
favoured under the previously discriminatory legisla-
tion. This from the principle that changes in the legisla-
tion to correct a wrongdoing should not be to the detri-
ment of the workers who were previously not in a disad-
vantaged position.87 To illustrate the reasoning of the
CJEU in these cases, two cases will be addressed in
more detail: Schmitzer88 and Specht e.o.89
Schmitzer concerns an Austrian transitional measure
that purported to serve several aims: objectives of proce-
dural economy, respect for acquired rights and the pro-
tection of legitimate expectations, and budgetary con-
straints.90 With respect to the last aim, the CJEU
referred to its judgment in Fuchs & Köhler91 and argued
that, similarly to private businesses, budgetary issues of
administrative nature ‘cannot in themselves constitute a
legitimate aim within the meaning of Article 6(1) of
Directive 2000/78’.92 With regard to the acquired rights
and the protection of the legitimate expectations, the
Court considered that these could constitute a legitimate
aim that can justify the maintenance of different treat-
ment in a transitional period.93 However, even though
the measure in this case preserves the acquired rights
and legitimate expectations of the civil servants who will
not be subject to the new advancement rules (especially
the five-year period for the first advancement instead of
two years under the previous rules), it cannot justify a
measure that maintains the age-based difference in
treatment.94 Such a measure ‘is not appropriate for the
purpose of establishing a non-discriminatory system for
civil servants who were disadvantaged by that previous
system’.95
In Specht e.o. the CJEU had to consider national legisla-
tion that introduced a new remuneration system for civil
86. E.g. Case 24/17 Österreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund, Gewerkschaft
Öffentlicher Dienst v. Republik Österreich ECLI:EU:C:2019:373, Rec
11.
87. Cf. Joined Cases 501/12 to 506/12, 540/12 and 541/12 Thomas
Specht and Others v. Land Berlin and Bundesrepublik Deutschland
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2005, Rec 64, with reference to Case 456/05 Commis-
sion v. Germany ECLI:EU:C:2007:775, Rec 63.
88. Case 530/13 Leopold Schmitzer v. Bundesministerin für Inneres
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2359.
89. Specht a.o., above n. 87.
90. Schmitzer, above n. 88, Rec 39 and 40.
91. Fuchs & Köhler, above n. 62, Rec 73-4.
92. Schmitzer, above n. 88, Rec 41.
93. Schmitzer, above n. 88, Rec 42, with reference to joined cases 297/10
and 298/10 Hennings and Mai ECLI:EU:C:2011:560, Rec 90-1.
94. Owing to the change in the period for first advancement from two
years to five years, civil servants who were disadvantaged under the
previous system and who opted for a reassessment of their advance-
ment under the new system would again be discriminated against in
relation to the favoured group because the first advancement period for
the disadvantaged civil servants would be three years longer, putting
them again at a disadvantage compared with the same group of civil
servants.
95. Schmitzer, above n. 88, Rec 44.
servants to correct a previously discriminatory wrong.
The starting point for further advancement within the
new system, however, was based solely on the amount of
pay under the old system. Consequently, the civil serv-
ants that were treated less favourably by the previous
system would start at a disadvantage in the new system.
The new system compensates partly for the disadvan-
tage because all civil servants would be entitled to one
additional (transitional) step based on which they would
then be placed into the new pay step that corresponds
the closest with an additional round-up of the pay to
that step. Although this means an advancement for all
civil servants, the effect of the previous discriminatory
rule is not neutralised completely.96 Similarly to Schmit-
zer, the Court acknowledged that preserving acquired
rights can be a legitimate aim as an ‘overriding reason in
the public interest.’97 Moreover, the CJEU found the
measure appropriate also because without it many civil
servants would have incurred a loss in salary equivalent
to one step (i.e. 80-150 EURO).98 The Court also con-
siders the measure necessary, among other reasons,
because of the administrative burden if, retrospectively,
the position of every civil servant would have to be
reviewed individually. Second, for as far as there would
still be some differences, these would fade away after a
few years since the transitional measure provided in a
more favourable repositioning in the wage-scale.99
What we can get from these two cases is that the CJEU
is sensitive to the argument that the transitional measure
aims to preserve acquired rights by those that were fav-
oured by the previous measure. Therefore, the transi-
tional measure does not have to completely neutralise
the discriminatory effect of the previous measure
(Specht e.o.); however, there is a margin that needs to be
observed. In Schmitzer the transitional measure clearly
exceeded that margin, since it maintained the difference
in treatment on the grounds of age, and, moreover, it
actually created a new difference of treatment that could
directly be related to age. Since these cases are based on
the Hütter ruling, in which the Court clearly reflected a
fair innings argument, the same is found here: it is all
about creating substantive equality in order to provide
all persons with equal opportunities in working life.
The cases Pohl100 and Starjakob101 are also related to
Hütter since they too deal with transitional national
measures to correct a previously unjustifiable discrimi-
natory measure. The issue addressed in these cases,
however, is not the correcting measure itself, but the
periodic limitations to reassess accrediting periods for
96. Specht a.o., above n. 88, Rec 53-8.
97. Ibid., Rec 64, with reference to Case 456/05 Commission v. Germany
ECLI:EU:C:2007:755, Rec 63 and Hennings and Mai, above n. 93, Rec
90.
98. Specht a.o., above n. 88, Rec 65-7.
99. Ibid, Rec 80-3.
100. Case 429/12 Siegfried Pohl v. ÖBB Infrastruktur AG ECLI:EU:C:
2014:12.
101. Case 417/13 ÖBB Personenverkehr AG v. Gotthard Starjakob
ECLI:EU:C:2015:38. This case also dealt with a newly adopted measure
that aimed to right a previously unjustifiable discriminatory measure.
The newly adopted measure was found discriminatory as well.
86
ELR augustus 2020 | No. 1 - doi: 10.5553/ELR.000159
advancement. Pohl’s request for a reassessment of his
periods of service that should have been taken into
account for his advancement on the salary scale was
refused because the statutory period of thirty years
starting from the moment the employment contract
commenced had elapsed. The CJEU clarified that
whether the starting point of a limitation period would
be changed was a matter for national law and that
the fact that the Court may have ruled that the breach
of European Union law has occurred generally does
not affect the point at which that period starts to
run.102
The Court repeated this in Starjakob.103 Again, since
these cases are about creating substantive equality by
correcting the effects of a previously discriminatory
measure, these fit with the fair innings argument.
The remaining three cases in this category are not relat-
ed to Hütter. Tyrolean Airways104 and Bowman105 show
similarities in that both deal with lengths of service and
experience rather than a particular age group. In Tyro-
lean Airways this became an issue because workers with
similar length of work experience were treated differ-
ently, the only experience taken into account for
advancement being that gained in employment with
Tyrolean Airways. This would put experienced cabin
crew members who previously worked for Austrian Air-
lines or Lauda Air in a disadvantaged position; hence it
indirectly discriminates older workers.106 The CJEU
considered that even though the challenged measure
falls within the scope of the directive,107 it does not con-
stitute discrimination on grounds of age, since the dif-
ferential treatment is based purely on the date of
recruitment.108 The fact that work experience is not
taken into account at the moment the employment con-
tract commences is not related to age.109 It applies to
everyone who starts to work for Tyrolean Airlines, irre-
spective of whether someone is young, old or middle-
aged. No distinction by age, direct or indirect, means no
age discrimination. In Bowman the CJEU also con-
cluded that there is no issue of age discrimination since
the inclusion of periods of school education and the
extension of the period for advancement within the
first step of the salary scheme, applies in the same
way to all workers who make a request for such inclu-
102. Pohl, above n. 100, Rec 31, with reference to Joint Cases 89/10 and
96/10 Q-Beef NV v. Belgische Staat and Frans Bosschaert v. Belgische
Staat, Vleesgroothandel Georges Goossens en Zonen NV and Slachthui-
zen Goossens NV, [2011] ECR I-07819, Rec 48.
103. Starjakob, above n. 101, Rec 59-75.
104. Case 132/11 Tyrolean Airways Tiroler Luftfahrt Gesellschaft mbH v.
Betriebsrat Bord der Tyrolean Airways Tiroler Luftfahrt Gesellschaft
mbH ECLI:EU:C:2012:329.
105. Case 539/15, Daniel Bowman v. Pensionsversicherungsanstalt
ECLI:EU:C:2016:977.
106. Tyrolean Airways, above n. 104, Rec 20, preliminary question 1.
107. Ibid., Rec 24.
108. Ibid., Rec 29.
109. Ibid.
sion, including, retroactively, workers who have
already reached higher steps.110
These rulings reflect again a more complete life view
since they reflect a rather egalitarian appreciation of the
measures.
Differing completely from any of the previous cases in
this category is Bartsch,111 which deals with an issue of
‘relative’ age, meaning that there exists an age require-
ment in legislation not defined by an absolute age but by
age related to the age of another person. More concrete-
ly, the measure in Bartsch stipulated that widower pen-
sions would not be paid if ‘the widow/widower is more
than 15 years younger than the former employee’.112
Unfortunately, at the time the facts of the case took
place and the case was brought to court, the implemen-
tation period for the FED had not expired yet, and the
CJEU therefore found the case inadmissible and gave no
ruling.113
4.4 Analysis of the Cases in the Category
‘Middle-Aged’
The last category to address is ‘middle-aged’. What
links these cases is that all national measures set a maxi-
mum age, owing to which older workers are denied
access either to education/training or employment.
Often the age limit lies around thirty or thirty-five;
hence the classification as middle-aged.
In this group the CJEU found only the national measure
in Vital Pérez114 to be excluded by the FED (see Table
1). The measure fixes a maximum age of thirty for
recruitment of local police officers. It could be consid-
ered as a genuine job requirement within the meaning of
Article 4(1) FED, given the particular physical capaci-
ties needed for the job,115 but, given the fact that there is
no need to maintain a particular age structure within the
police service116 and that the physical requirements are
not ‘exceptionally high’,117 the CJEU concluded that the
age requirement cannot appropriately be justified as a
genuine job requirement.118 Secondly, the CJEU con-
sidered whether the measure could be justified by Art-
icle 6(1) FED. As a legitimate aim, the referring court
pointed out that the age limit was related to training
requirements for the post in question and ‘the need for a
reasonable period of employment before retirement or
transfer to another activity’.119 However, as no (concrete
enough) evidence has been presented to support the
measure in the main proceedings as appropriate or nec-
110. Bowman, above n. 105, Rec 31.
111. Case 427/06, Birgit Bartsch v. Bosch und Siemens Hausgeräte (BSH)
Altersfürsorge GmbH, [2008] ECR I- 07425.
112. Ibid., Rec 7.
113. Ibid., Rec 17 and 25.
114. Case 416/13 Mario Vital Pérez v. Ayuntamiento de Oviedo ECLI:EU:C:
2014:2371.
115. Ibid., Rec 37 and 41, with reference to Prigge, above n. 46, Rec 67; and
Wolf (case 229/08, ECLI:EU:C:2010:3), Rec 41.
116. Vital Pérez, above n. 114, Rec 56.
117. Ibid., Rec 54.
118. Ibid., Rec 57.
119. Ibid., Rec 64.
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essary to achieve that aim, the CJEU indicated that such
a measure could not be justified by Article 6(1) FED.120
In Salaberria Sorondo,121 a similar measure as the one in
Vital Peréz was challenged; however, the facts were dif-
ferent, resulting in the outcome that the age require-
ment constituted indeed a justifiable genuine job
requirement.122 The CJEU considered that the measure
was much better substantiated with statistical evidence,
in particular the need for ‘(re-)establishing a satisfactory
age pyramid’, which ought to be taken dynamically, that
is with a view to the future.123 Secondly, the Court con-
sidered that the functions were different in that for the
latter young recruits would be assigned the physically
most demanding jobs.124 With reference to Wolf, in
which case the measure set an age limit (of thirty) for
the recruitment of firefighters,125 the CJEU acknowl-
edged that when physical requirements are ‘exceptional-
ly high’ it is clear that these can be performed only by
young workers.126 Furthermore, the CJEU acknowl-
edged that to ensure the efficient functioning of the fire
service it may be necessary that the majority of the
workers are younger than forty-five or fifty. In this
light, the CJEU argued that the age at which a fire fight-
er is recruited determines how long he will be able to
perform the job.127 Hence, under such conditions an age
limit can be considered as a genuine job requirement.128
The Court’s reasoning in these cases comes closest to a
more typical anti-discriminatory approach
The last case in this category, De Lange,129 deals with an
income tax measure that allows full reduction of voca-
tional training costs for persons under thirty and limits
this to the amount of 15,000 EURO for persons older
than thirty. The measure aims to make it more attractive
for young persons to pursue vocational training in order
to improve their position in the labour market, which
qualifies as a legitimate aim under Article 6(1) FED.130
Moreover, the CJEU found the measure appropriate
and necessary, since, as argued by the Dutch govern-
ment, in general persons over the age of thirty have
had the opportunity to undertake prior training and
to pursue a professional activity, with the result that,
being in a better financial position than young people
who have recently left the school system, they are
able to bear at least in part the financial burden of
new training.131
120. Ibid., Rec 70-3.
121. Case 258/15 Gorka Salaberria Sorondo v. Academia Vasca de Policía y
Emergencias ECLI:EU:C:2016:873.
122. Ibid., Rec 50.
123. Ibid., Rec 47.
124. Ibid., Rec 46.
125. Wolf, above n. 115.
126. Ibid., Rec 41.
127. Ibid., Rec 43.
128. Ibid., Rec 45.
129. Case 548/15 J.J. De Lange v. Staatssecretaris van Financiën ECLI:EU:C:
2016:850.
130. Ibid., Rec 29.
This is very clearly a fair innings argument.
5 Evaluation and Conclusions
In this section I evaluate the reasoning of the CJEU
against the background of the theoretical approaches
presented in Section 2, i.e. complete life view, fair
innings argument and a more typical anti-discriminato-
ry approach. For this evaluation it is important to
understand, in general, the arguments of the CJEU in
deciding that a measure would or would not be preclu-
ded by the FED. The analysis of this is summarised in
Table 3.
Click here for a PDF-version of Table 3.
A number of conclusions can be drawn from this table:
First, a good number of cases are not precluded by the
FED because they do not deal with age discrimination
(Pohl), fall outside the scope of the directive (Bartsch),
are not an issue of age discrimination (Florescu, SCMD,
Escribano Vindel, Horgan and Keegan, Tyrolean Airways,
and Bowman) or fall within the exception of Article 6(2)
FED (Parris and Lesar). Second, a few reasons for pre-
clusion or not are reflective of each other. These are as
follows:
– age is indirectly involved because it is connected to
the length of service that is taken as a differentiating
criterion (HK Denmark, Kleinsteuber) versus age
directly and as a sole differentiating criterion (Man-
gold);
– age as genuine job requirement/balanced age struc-
ture being appropriate and necessary (Wolf, Sala-
berria Sorondo, Fuchs & Köhler) versus not being
appropriate and necessary (Prigge, Vital Peréz); and
– sufficient (Hennings and Mai, Specht e.o., Stollwit-
zer, Unland, and Österreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund)
versus insufficient (Starjakob, Schmitzer, and Leit-
ner) neutralisation of the effect of a previously dis-
criminatory measure.
Furthermore, this table clearly shows that some reasons
are more typical of a certain age category, e.g. whether
there is access to an alternative source of income seems
to be typical of older workers, and the sufficient neutral-
isation of a previously discriminatory measure is typical
of the category ‘other’.
In Table 4 the arguments of the CJEU have been related
to the theoretical approaches. Indications on this have
already been given in Section 4; the table merely sum-
marises it.
Click here for a PDF-version of Table 4.
131. Ibid., Rec 33.
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Table 3 Summarised analysis of the CJEU’s arguments in cases on age discrimination
Reasons not
precluded
Old Yng M Other Reasons preclu-
ded
Old Yng M Other
Not in scope /
not on age
C Bartch;
Pohl
No discrimi-
nation on
grounds of age
SCMD;
Florescu
O; Escri-
bano
Vindel;
Horgan
& Kee-
gan
Tyrolean
airlines;
Bowman
Exception Art.
6(2) FED
Parris Lesar
Access alterna-
tive income /
income security
Palacios
de la Vil-
la; Age
Concern;
Rose-
nbladt;
Geor-
giev;
Hörn-
veldt;
Huber-
tus;
Odar;
Tekniq
Horgan
and Kee-
gan
Reduction in
(alternative)
income /
interest persons
not sufficiently
taken into
account
Ingeniørf
orenin-
gen i
Dan-
mark;
Rasmus-
sen;
Dansk
Jurist;
Commis-
sion v
Hungary
Labour market
situation taken
into account
Petersen;
Felber
Aber-
crombie
De Lange Measure results
in unequal
treatment of
persons in same
age group
Kücükde-
veci;
Hütter
Age indirectly –
length of ser-
vice (pro rata
temporis)
HK Den-
mark;
Klein-
steuber
Age sole criteri-
on
Mangold
Age as job
requirement /
balanced age
structure
Fuchs &
Köhler;
Werner
Fries
Wolf;
Salaber-
ria Sor-
ondo
Age as job
requirement is
inappropriate
Prigge Vital Pér-
ez
Sufficient neu-
tralisation previ-
ously discrimi-
natory effect,
incl. protection
established
advantages
Hennings
& May;
Specht
e.o.;
Stollwit-
zer;
Unland;
Österrei-
chischer
Gewerk-
schafts-
bund
Insufficient neu-
tralisation previ-
ously discrimi-
natory effect
Starjakob;
Schmit-
zer; Leit-
ner
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Table 4 CJEU’s case law ordered by theoretical approach
Not Precluded Precluded
Old Young Middle-
aged
Other Old Young Middle-
aged
Other
Complete life view Palacios
de la Villa;
Age Con-
cern;
Hubertus;
Petersen;
Klein-
steuber;
Rose-
nbladt;
Hörnveldt;
Odar; HK
Denmark;
Ingeniørfo
reningen i
Danmark
v Tekniq;
Felber;
Parris;
Lesar;
Escribano
Vindel;
Horgan
and Kee-
gan
Tyrolean
Airlines;
Bowman
Mangold;
Ingeniørfo
reningen i
Danmark;
Rasmus-
sen; Dansk
Jurist
Fair innings argument Georgiev;
Fuchs &
Kohler;
Florescu;
SCMD
O; Aber-
crombie
De Lange Pohl; Hen-
nings &
May;
Specht
e.o.;
Unland;
Stollwit-
zer; Öster-
reichischer
Gewerk-
schafts-
bund
Commis-
sion v
Hungary
Hütter;
Kücükde-
veci
Starjakob;
Schmitzer;
Leitner
Traditional anti-discr.
approach
Werner
Fries
Salaberria
Sorondo;
Wolf
Prigge Vital Pérez
NB: The cases C and Bartch are not in this table because the CJEU did not consider them on their merits.
What stands out from this table is that many measures
(twelve out of sixteen) treating older workers less
favourably have not been precluded by the FED, where-
as only four of them have been precluded. The contrast
becomes even stronger when we realise that the three
cases in the age category ‘young’ that reflect a complete
life view approach either did not constitute age discrimi-
nation because something else was found (more) distinc-
tive (Escribano Vindel; Horgan and Keegan) or fall under
the exception of Article 6(2) FED (Lesar). In absolute
numbers it means that older persons have had to accept
disadvantageous treatment more often than younger
persons.
When evaluating the cases that seem to reflect the fair
innings argument the CJEU seems to favour the posi-
tion of young workers over that of older workers. This is
the situation in cases affecting young people, as well as
middle-aged and old people. While in Hütter it was an
issue of unequal treatment within the age category
‘young’, in Kücükdeveci it was an intergenerational mat-
ter that provided stronger protection for older workers
than younger workers and was found by the CJEU to be
precluded by the FED. In the cases Georgiev and Fuchs
& Kohler the situation was reversed since the measures
that were challenged aimed to improve the position of
young persons at the cost of older persons who had
already had their chances. The same is true for De
Lange with regard to access to education: the challenged
tax measure favoured people under the age of thirty,
since people older than thirty were presumed to have
90
ELR augustus 2020 | No. 1 - doi: 10.5553/ELR.000159
had chances to study and gather more resources to pay
for their education. Add to this the cases Wolf and Sala-
berria Sorondo, both setting an age limit with respect to
access to employment, and the picture of young people
being favoured over older people in the CJEU’s case law
becomes even more resilient.
What we get is what I have already indicated at the
beginning of the paper as being a toxic combination:
under the complete life view more measures have been
accepted that negatively affect old people rather than
young people; and under the fair innings argument
more measures have been accepted that positively affect
young people to the detriment of middle-aged and old
people. The overall image of this combination is that the
CJEU is more lenient in accepting disadvantageous
measures for older people and more strict in protecting
young people. Thus, while the relative numbers of
measures that the CJEU found to be precluded by the
FED do not indicate a significant difference in treat-
ment between young and old, the reflective evaluation
of the CJEU’s rulings based on the theoretical
approaches, especially the complete life view and fair
innings argument, does indicate a significant difference.
Maybe the CJEU is not aware of its bias, but by not
having made a clear choice on how to evaluate age
discrimination cases, a practice of unequal treatment has
grown. The conclusion is, therefore, that the CJEU
indeed discriminates in age discrimination cases.
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